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1 Introduction
Competition in banking sectors is often conducive to banks being involved in high-risk
activities. Keeley (1990), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004),
among many others, argue that high competition in the deposit market reduces a bank’s
incentives for prudent behaviour through the reduction of a bank’s franchise value. A
plethora of measures thus have been adopted by the prudential regulators to promote
safety of the banking systems in the developed and emerging economies. Following the
recommendations of Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, different forms of mini-
mum capital requirement and deposit rate ceiling, or a combination of both (Hellmann,
Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo, 2004) are applied in order to curb banks’ incentives
for risk taking. On the other hand, deposit insurance is in use to enhance depositors’
confidence and prevent systemic financial crises (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
The main purposes of this paper are to analyse the nature of the association between
market power and bank risk taking when banks compete in a monopolistically com-
petitive deposit market, and then exploit such association to study the effects of bank
mergers and deposit insurance on the risk taking behaviour. To this end, we analyse a
model of locational competition à la Salop (1979). Banks collect deposits from the po-
tential depositors by offering deposit rates and invest their total funds (deposits plus
equity capital) either in a prudent or a gambling asset, and the depositors incur a per
unit transport cost to travel to a bank in order to deposit their funds.1 No bank can
commit to the choice of the degree of investment risk (safe or risky) since this decision is
taken after the depositors have deposited their funds. In our model, risk neutral banks
are subject to limited liability. The gambling asset offers an expected return lower than
that of the prudent asset, but has a higher return if it succeeds. The above characteristics
of the assets make the banks prone to choose a risky investment which creates a moral
1This should not literally be interpreted as the cost (or time) a depositor spends in traveling to a bank.
Banks could be differentiated because of differences in ATM facilities, availability in various geographic
areas, internet banking services, etc. This is part of the transaction costs incurred by the depositors.
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hazard problem at the bank level.
We show that in equilibrium there is a negative association between market power and
bank risk taking. The intermediation margin of the banks is increasing in the ratio of the
transport cost to the number of banks. Hence, as in Salop (1979), we use the transport
cost relative to the number of banks as the measure of market power. For very low
levels of market power, all banks invest in the gambling asset offering a high equilibrium
deposit rate. If market power is very high, then a gambling equilibrium ceases to exist, and
the banks invest in the prudent asset and offer a lower deposit rate, which is referred to
as a prudent equilibrium. For an intermediate level of market power, both of the aforesaid
equilibria exist. Next we analyse the effect of market power on welfare. Social welfare
corresponding to both gambling and prudent equilibria decreases with market power
since higher market power leads to lower consumer surplus. On the other hand, higher
market power induces lower propensity to gambling. Thus, social welfare is maximised
for a strictly positive level of market power. We further analyse the effect of bank merger
on the equilibrium risk taking. Merger between banks increases banks’ intermediation
margin and makes gambling less likely. In other words, merger can be viewed as a
substitute for prudential regulation that aims at guaranteeing financial stability. Finally,
we study the effect of the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme on the equilibrium
of the banking sector. Diamond and Dybvig (1987) argues that deposit insurance serves
to protect the depositors in face of bank failure and to enhance depositors’ confidence
that prevents bank runs. We show that such a scheme may exacerbate the risk-enhancing
moral hazard problem by making gambling by the banks more likely which conforms to
a number of empirical findings.
The negative association between market power and bank risk taking has been es-
tablished, among many others, by Matutes and Vives (1996) and Repullo (2004). Our
work is similar to that of Repullo who considers a dynamic model of banking based on
spatial competition à la Salop (1979) with insured depositors to show that for very low
3
level of market power, low intermediation margins reduce banks’ franchise value and
induce banks invest only in the gambling asset. Our model differs from Repullo (2004)
in the following aspects. We consider a model of static bank competition. We believe
this to be adequate in order to analyse the effects of market power since, in the long
run, free entry washes away monopoly rents that the banks enjoy in the short run. Hell-
mann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) consider a model of bank competition to argue that
a minimum capital requirement alone cannot serve as an effective prudential regulatory
instrument, and this has to be combined with a deposit rate ceiling in order that effi-
ciency can be achieved. Repullo (2004) shows that a risk-based capital requirement can
undermine banks’ incentive for risk taking and promote safety. Our model also retains
similarity with the work of Matutes and Vives (1996), which considers a model of bank
competition where depositors have beliefs about the probability of failure of the banks,
and banks can choose to invest in different assets with different degrees of riskiness that
depends on the market share of each bank. It is the presence of depositors’ beliefs what
generates consistency requirements that should be fulfilled in any equilibrium. Our
model also imposes similar consistency requirements on the equilibria. Since we avoid
the complexity added by the existence of such beliefs, these requirements boil down to
a no gambling condition requiring that if a bank makes its clients believe that it is going
to invest in the prudent asset, in equilibrium it indeed does so. In a seminal paper, Boyd
and De Nicoló (2005) suggest that the above mentioned negative relationship between
market power and risk taking can be reversed if one considers simultaneous interaction
between the deposit and the loan markets in which the borrowers, rather than the banks,
choose the riskiness of a bank’s investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model with unin-
sured deposits. The following section describes and characterises the equilibrium of
the banking sector, and studies the effect of market power on social welfare. Section
4 analyses the effects of bank merger and deposit insurance on the banks’ risk taking
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behaviour. The paper concludes in Section 5. Proofs of our main results are presented
in the appendices.
2 Model
Consider a banking sector with n risk neutral banks located uniformly on a unit circle.
Each bank i has a fixed amount of equity capital k.2 Banks compete in deposit rates in
order to mobilise deposits. Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) be the deposit rates offered by the banks
with ri > 1 for each i. Bank i’s total deposits are given by D(ri, r−i), where r−i is the
vector of rates offered by the other banks.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral depositors, also uniformly distributed on the
unit circle, with a unit of fund apiece. A depositor can deposit her fund in a bank which
pays off a deposit rate in the next period. Deposits are assumed not to be insured.3 Each
depositor incurs a per unit transport cost t in order to travel to a bank.
Each bank invests its total fund (deposits plus capital) either in a prudent or a gam-
bling asset.4 The asset return is in general stochastic with a given probability distribu-
tion, and is equal to y˜. In case of the prudent asset, y˜ = α > ri for all i = 1, . . . , n with
probability 1, i.e., the return on the prudent asset is constant. For the gambling asset, on
the other hand, we have y˜ = γ > α with a given probability θ and y˜ = 0 with probability
1− θ. We assume that the success or failure of the gamble is independent across banks,
and the prudent asset has an expected return higher than that of the gambling asset,
i.e., α > θγ. A bank i’s intermediation margin is given by µ = E[y˜ − r1], where E[ . ]
represents the expected value of the random variable. Each bank is subject to limited
liability, i.e., in case a bank’s project fails its depositors are not paid back.
2We do not explicitly model the sources of bank’s capital. This may be the total of a bank’s issued
shares. We assume this to be exogenously given to a bank before it enters the deposit market.
3In Section 4 we analyse the effects of the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme.
4A bank might invest a fraction of its total fund in each asset. It is easy to show that, under limited
liability, optimality would imply that banks choose only one asset to invest in.
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The timing of events is as follows. Banks simultaneously offer deposit rates. Depos-
itors then choose the bank in which to deposit their funds. The deposit mobilisation is
followed by the portfolio choice of the banks. Finally, project outputs are realised and
the depositors are paid off. This timing is crucial in characterising the equilibrium risk
taking behaviour. Since the investment decision is taken after the depositors have de-
posited their funds, a bank is unable to commit to a particular investment strategy. Thus
the assumption that γ > α along with limited liability imply that the banks find it more
attractive to invest in the gambling asset, which gives rise to a potential moral hazard
problem at the bank level.
3 Equilibrium of the Banking Sector
3.1 Description
In this section we characterise the equilibrium of the banking sector where banks com-
pete in the deposit market by offering deposit rates and choose a prudent asset or a
gambling asset to invest in, and each depositor chooses a bank to place her fund. We fo-
cus on two types of symmetric equilibria. A prudent equilibrium where all banks choose
to invest in the prudent asset, and a gambling equilibrium in which all banks invest in
the gambling asset. We look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the stage game.
If a bank i chooses to invest in the prudent asset and the gambling asset, its expected
profits are respectively given by
piP(ri, r−i) = αk + (α− ri)D(ri, r−i), (1)
piG(ri, r−i) = θγk + θ(γ− ri)D(ri, r−i). (2)
We solve the stage game by backward induction. A bank would choose to invest in the
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prudent asset if the expected profits from doing so exceed the expected profits from the
gambling asset, i.e., piP ≥ piG. This occurs if the total deposits of a bank satisfies the
following no gambling condition (henceforth, NGC).
Di ≤ (α− θγ)k(1− θ)ri − (α− θγ)
. (3)
Denote by m ≡ α− θγ, which is a bank’s expected marginal benefit of choosing to invest
in the prudent asset instead of gambling. We assume that (1− θ)−m > 0 in order that
the term in the right hand side of the above inequality is positive. If the above inequality
is reversed, i.e., a gambling condition (henceforth, GC) holds, then a bank would invest in
the gambling asset. The condition NGC is a sort of incentive compatibility condition for
the banks. As we have mentioned above that the structure of returns of the assets gives
rise to a moral hazard problem that induces the banks to gamble, the above incentive
compatibility condition makes the banks behave prudently. If the depositors preferred
their banks to invest in the safe asset and if the banks could commit to be prudent, then
it would not be necessary to impose an NGC.
In the second stage, a depositor takes the decision whether to place her fund in a bank.
Consider a particular bank i and a depositor at a distance x from the bank. Suppose that
she anticipates that the bank will invest in the prudent asset. Then she would deposit
her unit fund if the following participation condition holds.
ri − 1 ≥ tx. (4)
In case the depositor expects the bank to gamble, the above condition turns out to be
θri − 1 ≥ tx. (5)
If one of the above two conditions is satisfied for each of the depositors, then no one
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leaves her fund idle. In other words, all the depositors in the economy are served by
at least one bank. In this case a covered market is said to emerge. If one of the above
conditions does not hold for at least one depositor located between two neighbouring
banks, then an uncovered market emerges. In the subsequent sections we only analyse the
equilibria of a covered market.5 It is worth noting that the depositors have no control
over the portfolio choices of the banks. The above participation conditions imply that if
a bank chooses to gamble instead of being prudent, then it must offer a higher deposit
rate to its clients.
In the first stage of the game each bank sets the deposit rate in order to maximise its
expected profits. In course of doing so, the banks must take into account the possible
outcomes of the subgame that follows (stages 2 and 3). Hence, the aforesaid restrictions
are imposed as constraints on the banks profit maximisation problem. For example,
when all banks maximise expected profits subject to (3) and (4), then a prudent equilibrium
is said to arise. It is worth noting that the condition NGC or GC determines banks’
portfolio choice that follows the decision taken by the depositors. If there is a small
number of depositors who place their funds in a particular bank, then this bank is more
likely to invest in the prudent asset (since the NGC is more likely to be satisfied). Hence,
the conditions NGC and GC are endogenous rather than being exogenous constraints.
We analyse two types of symmetric equilibria of the stage game, namely a prudent
equilibrium and a gambling equilibrium. Let rP and rG denote the equilibrium deposit
rates offered by the banks when all of them respectively choose the prudent asset and
the gambling asset. A prudent equilibrium thus is a strategy profile in which all banks
offer rP and choose the prudent asset to invest in, and each depositor deposits her fund
in a bank. On the other hand, a gambling equilibrium is a strategy profile in which all
banks offer rG and choose to gamble, and each depositor deposits her fund in a bank.6
5Details of the characterisation of the equilibria of an uncovered market are available from the authors
upon request.
6See Appendix A for the expressions of rP and rG, and the necessary conditions under which they are
optimal choices.
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The intermediation margins for each bank in a prudent and in a gambling equilibria are
respectively given by µP = α− rP and µG = θ (γ− rG).
3.2 Characterisation
In the following proposition we characterise the equilibria of the deposit market. If
the transport cost increases relative to the number of banks, given the total number of
depositors, then each bank has a higher margin which reflects a higher market power. In
fact, it will be shown that, under both equilibria, the intermediation margins equal t/n.
Hence for our economy, t/n is taken as a measure of market power.
Proposition 1 For a given level of bank capital k,
(a) there exists a threshold level of market power, φ¯, such that if tn ∈ [0, φ¯] (low market power),
then only a gambling equilibrium exists with the banks offering deposit rate rG = γ− tθn ,
(b) if tn ∈
[
φ¯, φG
]
(intermediate values of market power), both a gambling and a prudent
equilibria exist with banks offering rG = γ− tθn , and rP = α− tn ,
(c) if tn ∈
[
φG, φP
]
(high values of market power), then only a prudent equilibrium exists with
banks offering rP = α− tn .
From the above proposition, notice that the intermediation margins in a gambling and
a prudent equilibria are µP = µG = t/n. The intuition behind the above proposition
is fairly simple. When the market power is very low, competition erodes banks’ profit,
thus leaving little incentive for them to invest in the prudent asset. On the other hand,
for very high degree of power, banks earn quasi-monopoly rent, and hence they have
incentives to choose the prudent asset in order to preserve that. For even a higher values
of t/n, the market becomes uncovered, i.e., banks offer even lower deposit rate which
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is not conducive to attract the depositors located at a longer distance.7 Proposition 1 is
summarised in the following figure.
[Insert Figure1 about here]
Also, for intermediate levels of power, banks might invest in the prudent asset by offering
a lower deposit rate rP, or in the gambling asset by offering a higher rate rG which
compensates for the expected loss to the depositors due to a positive probability of
failure in gambling.
3.3 Social Welfare
In the current set up social welfare is the total consumer surplus net of the aggregate
transport cost. Welfare is independent of the equilibrium deposit rate since it is a trans-
fer from the banks to the depositors. Thus, the social welfare under the prudent and
gambling equilibria are respectively given by
WP = α(kn + 1)− 2nt
∫ 1
2n
0
xdx = α(kn + 1)− t
4n
,
WG = θγ(kn + 1)− t
4n
.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between social welfare and the level of market power.
The curve labeled WG is the social welfare as a function of market power under a gam-
bling equilibrium, and that labeled WP is the welfare under a prudent equilibrium.8
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
7We only consider the interior solutions to the banks’ maximisation problem. There are equilibria with
two corner solutions, namely, rP = α − r¯, where r¯ is the deposit rate that makes the NGC satisfy with
equality when each bank has an amount of deposits equal to 1/n, and rP = 1+ (t/2n), the deposit rate
that makes the participation condition satisfy with equality for each bank. We do not consider the above
two equilibrium rates in order to avoid discontinuities in our analysis. We also omit the analysis of an
uncovered market that emerges for t/n > φP in which only a prudent equilibrium exists.
8We express the welfare as a function of t/n for convenience. It is indeed a function of t as n, the
number of banks is held fixed.
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Welfare under both equilibria decreases with market power. In particular, for a given
level of market power where both the equilibria exist, i.e., for a tn ∈
[
φ¯, φG
]
, welfare
is higher in case all banks behave prudently.9 From the above figure it is clear that
social welfare is discontinuous with respect to market power. It is also worth noting
that welfare is maximised at t/n = φ¯ > 0.10 The above findings are summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Social welfare decreases with market power both under gambling and prudent
equilibria. The levels of market power for which both equilibria exist, social welfare is always
higher under a prudent equilibrium. Moreover, social welfare is maximised at a strictly positive
level of market power.
There are two channels via which the level of market power affects social welfare. When
market power increases the aggregate consumer surplus is diminished, and hence lower
is the welfare. On the other hand, increased market power leads to prudent behaviour,
thereby increasing social welfare. These two opposite effects result in a maximum social
welfare not at the highest degree of competition (i.e., not at t/n = 0), but at a lower
degree of competition (at t/n = φ¯).
4 Extensions
In this section we study two extensions of the model presented in Section 3. The first is
the effect of an increase in the market power due to a merger between two neighbouring
banks on the circle. Next we analyse how the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme
exacerbates the moral hazard problem of the banks.
9This is because WP −WG = m(kn + 1) > 0.
10See Appendix B for a proof of this assertion.
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4.1 Bank Merger
Merger between banks enhances market power by increasing the intermediation mar-
gins. Keeping in mind the anti-competitive issues, merger is often viewed as welfare-
reducing because of its adverse effects on the consumer surplus. In the current set up,
following the analysis of the previous sections, merger among banks has an additional
effect because of its implications for risk taking. In particular, merger, via increased
market power, enhances the incentives for prudent behaviour of the banks. In reality the
competition authorities in most countries, while scrutinising a possible merger, would
not have in mind the implications of a merger for risk taking. This calls for a policy
coordination between the antitrust authority and the prudential regulator in the con-
text of a bank merger, the case that is quite different from a merger between two firms.
Having this motivation in mind, an extension of our baseline model is to analyse the
implications of horizontal mergers for the equilibrium of our model.
The effects of mergers in spatial competition models are studied, among others, by
Levy and Reitzes (1992) and Brito (2003). It is shown that mergers generally lead to
a price increase. Nonetheless, these models do not consider merger under investment
uncertainty. In this subsection, we focus on the implications of a merger for the risk
taking behaviour of the banks. We consider the case of a bilateral merger between any
pair of neighboring banks. Further, Brito (2003) shows that, in a circular city model,
closing one of the locations is not profitable for the merged entity. Thus, for analysing
the effect of a merger on the risk taking behaviour of banks, we make the following
assumption. When two neighbouring banks merge, the merged entity does not shut
down the operation in one of the two offices. In other words, a merged bank can be
viewed as a multiplant firm, operating the pre-merger banks as separate “plants”. This
can be justified by the existence of a sufficiently high relocation cost or a resistance
against layoffs by the employees. In addition, we assume for simplicity that no efficiency
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gains result in from a merger.11
Suppose that the timing of events described in Section 2 includes an initial stage
where a pair of neighbouring banks merge. When such merger takes place, a symmetry
argument cannot be applied to solve the game since the impact of the merger on rival
banks depends on their location. Without loss of generality, let the merged entity be
composed of banks i and i + 1. In this case, it is easy to show (Levy and Reitzes, 1993)
that after the merger takes place each bank offers a lower deposit rate and that the
deposit rate offered by a bank j ( 6= i and i + 1) is decreasing in its distance from the
merged entity. In the following proposition we analyse the impact of a merger on risk
taking.
Proposition 3 For each bank in the deposit market, the likelihood of prudent behaviour increases
following a pair of neighboring banks merge.
Proposition 2 suggests that a merger in the banking sector increases the likelihood that
the banks choose to invest in the prudent asset. The intuition behind this is as follows.
Prior to the merger each bank has independently maximised its expected profit. In the
post-merger stage, merged banks realise that lowering the deposit rate in one location
increases the expected profit in the other. Consequently, the merged entity lowers the
deposit rate, and this induces other banks to lower the deposit rate as well. Hence, both
the expected profits of investing in the prudent and the gambling assets increase for
all banks. A lower deposit rate or higher intermediation margin makes the NGC more
likely to be satisfied, thereby increasing the likelihood of prudent behaviour. One may
think that the above intuition is only true if the merging banks are neighbours since a
bank can affect only its neighbour’s profits. However, following Levy and Reitzes (1992),
a merger between non-neighboring banks in the circular city model also leads to a fall
11The efficiency gains from merger is generally realised in the long run. Thus, we find it more ap-
propriate not to make such assumptions in our static model which is essentially of short run in nature.
Further, we do not discuss merger profitability since a merger of any pair of neighbouring banks is always
profitable in the circular city model (Brito, 2003). Also, it is also well-known that mergers are generally
profitable when reaction functions are upward sloping (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985).
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in the deposit rate. Thus, our results would not substantively change if we have allowed
two non-neighbouring banks to merge.
4.2 Deposit Insurance
In this subsection we consider the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme that (par-
tially) insures each depositor. Deposit insurance schemes are designed to prevent sys-
temic confidence crises (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In the current context the effect of
such regulatory measure remains ambiguous for low deposit insurance. A little amount
of deposit insurance increases a bank’s deposit by compensating for the transport cost.
On the other hand, deposit insurance induces banks to compete more fiercely and thus
reduces bank’s incentives to behave prudently by increasing the moral hazard at the
bank level since they are protected by limited liability.
Under a deposit insurance scheme, which is denoted by δ ∈ (θ, 1], even if a bank i
fails while gambling, its depositors are paid back δ fraction of the promised deposit rate
ri. A full insurance scheme corresponds to δ = 1. Whenever δ < 1, the depositors are
partially insured, and the limiting case, where δ = θ, corresponds to no insurance.
In the following proposition we show that when the deposit insurance is sufficiently
high, then a gambling equilibrium exists over a higher range of the values of market
power compared to the case of no insurance. In other words, under a regime of (partial,
but high) deposit insurance banks are more likely to gamble.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold level of deposit insurance δ¯ ∈ (θ, 1) such that whenever
δ ≥ δ¯, the likelihood of gambling by all banks increases with δ.
Although the effect of deposit insurance on risk taking is not totally unambiguous (for
δ ≤ δ¯), the fact that a high deposit insurance exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem
is fairly intuitive. In general, since the banks are protected by limited liability in case
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the gamble fails, a high insurance induces them to gamble. In this case, as the banks do
not have to pay back their depositors, the underlying moral hazard has more bite on the
risk taking behaviour of the banks. Notice that, under a deposit insurance scheme δ, a
bank’s objective function under gambling changes (since it shifts out the total volume of
deposits); whereas that under prudent behaviour remains unchanged. This makes the
gambling asset more attractive for the banks. Consequently, deposit insurance induces
fiercer competition and leads to a situation where a gambling equilibrium is more likely
to occur.
What is then the effect of deposit insurance on welfare? Note that welfare does not
change directly because of the introduction of deposit insurance. This is because, al-
though the equilibrium deposit rates change, they are just transfers from the banks to
the depositors. Hence following Proposition 4, Figure 2 would look exactly the same
as that before the introduction of insurance, except the point φG (the upper limit of a
gambling equilibrium) shifting to the right due to an increase in the insurance amount
above δ¯. In other words, the range of the values of market power that supports both
equilibria now expands. Consequently, this measure may reduce welfare since there is
a range for which only a prudent equilibrium emerged, but its introduction would now
create the possibility of a gambling one.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses a model of a banking sector based on spatial competition, and establishes
a negative association between market power and risk taking by the banks. When the
banks compete only in the deposit market, the reason that induces a negative association
between market power and risk taking is fairly intuitive. Most of the works in this
context argue that a highly competitive banking sector leads to the erosion of current
profit, and thereby a decrease in the franchise value of the banks. A low franchise value
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diminishes a bank’s incentives for prudent behaviour as a successful gambling yields
high return. Such logic has been established in the literature (as in our case) under the
crucial assumption that banks can independently choose the level of asset risk. Boyd and
De Nicoló (2005) show that if the banks are allowed to compete both in the deposit and
credit markets, and if the banks do not have any control over the riskiness of the assets
they invest in (which is decided by the banks’ borrowers), then the established negative
association between market power and risk taking can be reversed. We, as done in the
long-standing literature on risk taking and market power, stick to the assumption that
banks are able to decide on the riskiness of their investment.
Unlike Hellmann, Murdock and Siglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004), our goal in this
paper is not to check the robustness of capital requirements and deposit rate ceiling
as efficient policy instruments. Analysing a simple model of monopolistic competition,
we establish a negative association between power and risk taking to show that bank
mergers can induce prudent behaviour. The reason is that a merger leads to increase
in market power via increased intermediation margin. Mergers are often viewed as
welfare-reducing because of their adverse anti-competitive effects on consumer surplus.
But in the presence of systemic risk and uncertainty the welfare implications of merger
may go in the other direction. Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) show that, when risk
aversion is strong enough, mergers between Cournot firms reduce prices and improve
social welfare. In the current context, a merger between two banks reduces the likelihood
of gambling as it generates higher intermediation margin for each bank, although higher
margins in both gambling and prudent equilibria imply lower consumer surplus. In a
similar context as ours, Perotti and Suárez (2002) suggest that allowing solvent banks
to acquire the failed ones is an effective regulatory instrument in promoting financial
stability in the short run.
As opposed to the positive effect of bank mergers on risk taking, a deposit insurance
scheme may increases the likelihood of gambling. Deposit insurance is a popular regula-
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tory measure that is sought to protect depositors from the expected loss due to excessive
speculation by banks. Such measure is adopted in almost all the countries with a few ex-
ceptions. We have argued that small amount of deposit insurance has ambiguous effect
on risk taking, whereas high insurance is conducive to more gambling by exacerbating
banks’ moral hazard problem, and it may even reduce social welfare by making gam-
bling more likely. At this juncture it is worth noting that a removal of deposit insurance
is not able to completely eliminate gambling since a gambling equilibrium exists even
with uninsured deposits. This is because the bank moral hazard problem emerges from
the high return of a successful gamble and limited liability, which is shown to be aggra-
vated by high deposit insurance. Our result is in conformity with the empirical findings
of Baer and Brewer (1986), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), and Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (1998), among many others, who assert that explicit deposit insurance may
provoke financial instability by exacerbating bank’s risk-enhancing moral hazard prob-
lem. In other words, high deposit insurance causes a significant reduction in market
discipline on bank risk taking, thereby increasing the banks’ incentives to gamble.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Prior to characterising the equilibria of the banking sector, we first analyse the necessary
conditions for existence of prudent and gambling equilibria. We assume that θγ + 2 <
3θ ri for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Prudent Equilibrium:
First we consider a symmetric prudent equilibrium in which all banks offer the same de-
posit rate and invest in the prudent asset, and all depositors are served. We compute the
total deposits of bank i when it offers ri and all the rival banks offer r. If the depositors
12This condition can be rewritten as θri−1θγ−1 >
1
3 . This implies that the proportion of net return to the
depositor at a distance 0 from bank i to the net return from investing a unit fund must be high enough in
order to attract this depositor.
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anticipate that all banks are going to choose the prudent asset, then the deposits of bank
i is given by:
D(ri, r) =
ri − r
t
+
1
n
. (6)
All banks must comply with the NGC in order that the market structure that arises at
equilibrium is indeed a prudent equilibrium. Second, there is no depositor who has an
incentive to keep her fund idle, i.e., for any depositor and for any bank the participation
condition (4) must hold good. Thus, bank i’s shareholders choose ri to maximise, subject
to NGC and (4), the following expected profit following problem:
αk + (α− ri)
(
ri − r
t
+
1
n
)
. (7)
Let ri = r = r
P be the candidate optima for the above maximisation problem, which are
summarised below.
rP =


r¯ if tn ≤ α− r¯,
α− tn if α− r¯ ≤ tn ≤ 2(α−1)3 ,
1+ t2n if
2(α−1)
3 ≤ tn ≤ 2(r¯− 1),
where r¯ ≡ m(1+nk)1−θ is the deposit rate that makes the NGC bind with equal deposit for
all banks. Notice that r¯ is an increasing function of a bank’s capital k. If all banks have
higher amount of k, the NGC is more likely to be satisfied for each bank, and hence they
are more likely to behave prudent. Also, it is clear from the NGC that, for a very low
levels of k, this condition is less likely to be satisfied. Therefore, k can be interpreted as
a minimum capital standard imposed by the central bank. And a suitable combination
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of ri and k can guarantee that the banks invest in the prudent asset.
13
Gambling Equilibrium:
In a symmetric gambling equilibrium all banks offer the same deposit rate and invest in
the gambling asset, and all depositors are served. We first compute the total deposits
of bank i when it offers a deposit rate ri and the rivals offer r. Note that if a bank i
promises a deposit rate ri, a depositor in this bank gets (in expected terms) θ ri back. If
the depositors anticipate that all banks are going to choose the gambling asset (i.e., for
all banks condition GC holds), the deposit of bank i is given by
D(ri, r) =
θ(ri − r)
t
+
1
n
. (8)
Here, one should take two restrictions into account. First, all the banks must comply
with the GC in order that the equilibrium is indeed a gambling equilibrium (stage 3 of
the game). Second, there is no depositor who has incentive to keep her fund idle, i.e.,
the participation condition (5) must hold good. Hence, bank i’s shareholders choose ri
to maximise, subject to GC and (5), the following expected profit
θγk + θ(γ− ri)
(
θ(ri − r)
t
+
1
n
)
. (9)
Let ri = r = r
G be the candidate optima for the above maximisation problem. These are
summarised below.
rG =


γ− tθn if tn ≤ θ(γ− r¯),
r¯ if θ(γ− r¯) ≤ tn ≤ 2(θr¯ − 1),
1
θ
(
1+ t2n
)
if tn ≥ 2(θr¯ − 1).
13See Proposition 2 in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) for a discussion.
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Now we check that under what conditions the above candidate deposit rates survive
as equilibria. Take a symmetric gambling equilibrium with deposit rate r and suppose
that a bank deviates to a deposit rate that will induce it to behave prudently. The profit
function following such deviation is given by:
piG→P = αk + (α− r∗)
(
r∗ − θr
t
+
1
n
)
.
This deviation r∗ must be credible. So we have to compute also the deposit rate, r′, that
will leave the bank indifferent between investing in the prudent asset and the gambling
asset. That is,
r∗ − θr
t
+
1
n
=
mk
(1− θ)r′ −m (10)
⇐⇒ r′ − θr =
(
r¯− r′
r′ − m1−θ
)
t
n
. (11)
Notice that the LHS is increasing and the RHS is decreasing in r′. Now take the three
candidates for a gambling equilibrium. We will see that deviations arise easily. Never-
theless, for sufficiently low levels of market power a gambling equilibrium exists. First,
consider rG = γ− tθn . Suppose first that the bank deviates to a rate r∗ that generates a
deposit greater than 1n . This occurs when
r∗ − θγ
t
+
2
n
>
1
n
⇐⇒ r∗ > θγ− t
n
.
In this case, it cannot be the case that r∗ ≥ r¯ because then the NGC is not satisfied and
the deviation is not credible. This imposes the restriction that θγ− tn < r∗ < r¯. Hence,
there can be no such deviation whenever tn < θγ− r¯. It is easy to see that if tn ≥ θγ− r¯,
then a bank can deviate by choosing r∗ = θγ− tn which is a credible deviation since it
generates the same deposit as before. Hence, this candidate for rG can be ruled out for
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the interval [θγ− r¯, θ(γ− r¯)]. Now, suppose that θγ− r¯ > tn . Notice that
∂piG→P
∂r∗
∣∣∣r∗=θγ− tn = mt > 0.
So that the deviator’s profit is increasing in r∗ for a deviation such that r∗ ≤ θγ − tn .
Since this deviation must be credible, the best the deviating bank can do is to set the
maximum deposit rate consistent with prudent behavior. After rewriting equation (10),
this rate is defined by the expression
r′ − θγ + t
n
=
(
r¯− r′
r′ − m1−θ
)
t
n
⇐⇒ r′ − θγ =
(
r¯− 2r′ + m1−θ
r′ − m1−θ
)
t
n
.
Notice that this condition is not the same as the NGC of the maximisation problem while
finding a prudent equilibrium.
Now we want to check when profits after this deviation are still below those under
the prudent equilibrium. Profits after and before deviation, respectively, are:
pi′ = αk +
(
α− r′)(r
′ − θγ
t
+
2
n
)
= θγk + θ(γ− r′)
(
r′ − θγ
t
+
2
n
)
,
piG = θγk +
t
n2
.
Tedious calculations show that pi′ ≤ piG if and only if:14
t
n
≤ θ(γ− r′)−
√
θ(γ− r′)
√
r′(1− θ) < θγ− r¯ , (12)
where the last inequality holds good whenever θγ − r¯ > tn .15 Thus we have found an
upper bound for this rG. Notice that this bound might be negative. This is the case
whenever θγ < r′. However, one can show that if tn ≤ θγ− r¯, then r′ < θγ− tn , and so
14There is another condition: tn ≥ θ(γ− r′) +
√
θ(γ− r′)
√
r′(1− θ). But if we assume that θγ− r¯ > tn ,
then it turns out that r′ < r¯, and hence this condition never holds good in the relevant region.
15Notice that θ(γ− r′)−√θ(γ− r′)√r′(1− θ) = θγ− r′+√r′(1− θ)(√r′(1− θ)−√θ(γ− r′)). When
θγ− r¯ > tn , both θγ > r′ > r¯ hold good.
21
the upper bound is positive. Let us write
ϕ
(
t
n
)
= θ(γ− r′)−
√
θ(γ− r′)
√
r′(1− θ) .
The fact that ϕ is a function of t/n makes it impossible to know a priori whether con-
dition (12) holds in the region [0, θγ− r¯]. Thus, we need then to find a fixed point of
ϕ
(
t
n
)
in order to ensure the existence of an interval where this candidate cannot be
dominated. First, it is easy to see that ϕ is decreasing in r′, and by the Implicit Function
Theorem, that ∂r′/∂
(
t
n
)
< 0. Hence, ϕ is increasing in t/n. Moreover, one can show that
r′(0) = θγ and that r′(θγ− r¯) = r¯. Hence, ϕ(0) = 0, and
ϕ(θγ− r¯) = θ(γ− r¯)−
√
θ(γ− r¯)
√
r¯(1− θ) < θγ− r¯.
Also ϕ(t/n) is concave. The above ensure the existence of a fixed point which is denoted
by ϕ¯. Next, consider the corner solution r¯. This generates profits equal to piG(r¯) =
θγk+ θ(γ− r¯) 1n = αk+ (α− r¯) 1n . If a bank deviates by choosing a deposit rate r′ = r¯ and
the prudent asset, then it obtains pi′ = αk + (α − θr¯) 1n , which is higher than that before
the deviation. Also r′ < r¯ and the deviation is credible (i.e., the bank indeed wants to
be prudent). Finally, consider the other corner solution 1θ
(
1+ t2n
)
. It is easy to see that
a bank can profitably deviate by posting a deposit rate 1+ t2n and choosing the prudent
asset to invest in. Hence a symmetric gambling equilibrium exists if and only if
t
n
≤ min
{
ϕ¯,
2(θγ− 1)
3
}
≡ φG.
Now consider a candidate for symmetric prudent equilibrium with deposit rate r and
suppose that a bank deviates to a deposit rate r∗ that will make it gamble. Following is
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the profits from such deviation.
piP→G = θγk + θ(γ− r∗)
(
θr∗ − r
t
+
1
n
)
.
Again one should consider as well the limit deposit rate r for the bank to credibly gamble
after the deviation. This rate is now defined by the following equation
θr− r
t
+
1
n
=
mk
(1− θ)r −m .
First, consider the corner solution rP = r¯. The deviating deposit rate is
r∗ =
r¯ + θγ
2θ
− t
2θn
,
Notice that for the profits after deviation to be greater than before, r∗ must satisfy the
following inequality:
(γ− r∗)(θr∗ − r¯) > t
n
(r∗ − r¯).
If with this deviation the bank gets a smaller deposit. i.e., if r∗ < r¯/θ, it cannot be the case
that r∗ < r¯, because otherwise the banks would want to gamble. And if r¯ ≤ r∗ ≤ r¯/θ,
it is easy to see that there is no r∗ satisfying the above condition. Hence, any deviation
must be such that r∗ > r¯/θ. Now, let use check what the deviation will be. The following
derivative
∂piP→G
∂r∗
∣∣∣∣r∗= r¯θ = θt
(
θγ− r¯− t
n
)
implies that if t/n ≥ θγ− r¯, the bank maximises profits by deviating with the minimal
r∗ possible, i.e., r¯/θ; but we know that in that case the bank is not better off by deviat-
ing. Therefore, t/n must be greater than θγ − r¯. The indirect profit function with this
deviation is given by
pi∗ = θγk +
1
t
(
θγ− r¯
2
+
t
2n
)2
.
23
Recall that the profits prior to the deviation were
piP = αk +
1
n
(α− r¯) = θγk + θ(γ− r¯)1
n
.
Hence, the deviation is profitable if and only if
θ(γ− r¯)2
4
−
(
θγ + (1− 2θ)r¯
2
)
t
n
+
(
t
2n
)2
> 0.
This above condition boils down to:16
t
n
< θγ + r¯(1− 2θ)− 2
√
(1− θ)r¯θ(γ− r¯) .
We also need to show that this deviation is credible. In fact one can show that r∗ > r¯
since this holds good whenever t/n < θγ + r¯(1− 2θ). This together with the fact that by
assumption this deviation generates a deposit D∗ > 1/n implies the consistency of this
interior deviation (recall that t/n < θγ− r¯). Hence, for this range, this candidate for rP
can be ruled out; it can only survive in the range
θγ + r¯(1− 2θ) + 2
√
(1− θ)(γ− r¯)θr¯ > α− r¯ = φ¯ ≤ t
n
.
Now consider the interior solution rP = α− r¯. There are two candidates for best reply.
The first one is the interior best response deviation r∗ = α+θγ2θ − tθn , and the other is the
limit deposit rate that is consistent with gambling, which is denoted by r and is given by
θr− α
t
+
2
n
=
mk
(1− θ)r −m .
16The other condition is t/n ≥ θγ + r¯(1− 2θ) + 2√(1− θ)r¯θ(γ− r¯) > α− r¯. So it has no bite in this
region.
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In that case
pi = θγk + θ(γ− r)
(
θr− α
t
+
2
n
)
= αk + (α− r)
(
θr− α
t
+
2
n
)
,
piP = αk +
t
n2
.
And
piP ≥ pi∗ ⇐⇒ t
n2
≥ (α− r)
(
θr− α
t
+
2
n
)
.
A bit of calculations show that the last inequality has no solution and that piP ≥ pi always
holds. Hence, we must focus on the case where the bank deviates with r∗ = α+θγ2θ − tθn .
One can show that this cannot be the case. The total deposit generated by this deviation
is 2n − mt which is positive if and only if t/n > m/2. We also have
pi∗ = θγk +
1
t
(
t
n
− m
2
)2
,
piP = αk +
t
n2
,
And
piP < pi∗ ⇐⇒ t
n
<
m2
4(1− θ)r¯ .
It is clear that m
2
4(1−θ)r¯ <
m
2 . So if under this deviation deposit is positive, the profits it
generates are smaller than under our candidate and therefore it survives as a symmetric
prudent equilibrium. Finally, consider the other corner solution rP = 1 + t2n . It is clear
that a bank will not deviate to an gambling deposit rate under an uncovered market. It
will not get a deposit greater than 1n and it will have to pay higher deposit rates. Then,
the only alternative is to deviate to a gambling deposit rate. The best response deposit
rate is given by
r∗ =
θγ + 1
2θ
− t
4θn
.
But it is easy to check that with this deposit rate the market is still uncovered. For the
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consumer at a distance 12n it is true that
θr∗ − t
2n
=
θγ + 1
2
− 3t
4n
< 1,
where the last inequality holds because in this case we have t/n ≥ 2(α−1)3 . Summarising
the above, one can say a symmetric prudent equilibrium exists if and only if
φ¯ ≤ t
n
≤ φP, where φP ≡ 2(r¯− 1).
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
The facts that, both under prudent and gambling equilibria, social welfare decreases
with market power, and that it is always higher under a prudent equilibrium are obvious
from the discussions in Section 4. Thus, we only prove the last part of Proposition 2. We
would like to show that WP
(
nφG
) ≥ WP(0). Notice that
WP
(
nφG
)
= α(kn + 1)− φ
G
4
,
WP(0) = θγ(kn + 1).
We know that
φG ≡ min
{
ϕ¯,
2(θγ− 1)
3
}
≤ 2(θγ− 1)
3
.
Therefore,
WP
(
nφG
)
≥ α(kn + 1)− (θγ− 1)
6
.
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On the other hand,
α(kn + 1)− (θγ− 1)
6
≥ θγ(kn + 1),
⇐⇒ m(kn + 1) = (1− θ)r¯ ≥ (θγ− 1)
6
,
⇐⇒ r¯ ≥ (θγ− 1)
6(1− θ) .
Recall that r¯ ≥ 1. Now we show that (θγ−1)
6(1−θ) ≤ 1. For this to happen, we need
γ ≤ 6(1− θ) + 1
θ
.
Now consider the assumption θγ + 2 < 3θ ri. For this to be meaningful, we need ri ≥ 1.
Therefore, the above assumption is equivalent to γ < 3θ−2θ . Hence, it only remains to
check that
3θ − 2
θ
≤ 6(1− θ) + 1
θ
⇐⇒ θ ≤ 1.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Without loss of generality, we consider the merger of banks i and i + 1. Let ΠP and
Π
G be the expected profits of the merged entity under prudent and gambling strategies
respectively. The profit maximization problem for the merged bank can be expressed as
max
ri, ri+1
Π
P ≡ piP (ri, r−i) + piP
(
ri+1, r−(i+1)
)
,
max
ri, ri+1
Π
G ≡ piG (ri, r−i) + piG
(
ri+1, r−(i+1)
)
.
A merger between a pair of neighbouring firms in the circular city model has been
analysed by Levy and Reitzes (1993) when transport costs are linear, who show that a
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merger of a pair of neighboring firms increases the price. Thus, following Levy and
Reitzes (1993), it is clear that the equilibrium deposit rates rP and rG decrease for all
banks i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, it is immediate to see that the NGC is more easily satisfied.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
When the depositors of a bank are insured a fraction δ of the deposit rate, the total
deposits of each bank i under a gambling strategy by all banks is given by
D(ri, r) =
δ(ri − r)
t
+
1
n
.
Thus to obtain a gambling equilibrium under deposit insurance, bank i’s shareholders
choose ri to maximise, subject to GC and (5), the following expected profit following
problem:
θγk + θ(γ− ri)
[
δ(ri − r)
t
+
1
n
]
. (13)
It is easy to show (similar to the proof of Proposition 1) that only the interior solution
γ− tδ n survives as an equilibrium deposit rate. And this exists only if
t
n
≤ δ(γ− r¯).
Further, it is easy to check that for t/n > δγ− r¯, a bank can profitably deviate by choos-
ing the prudent asset and a deposit rate δγ− t/n. So we will focus on the complementary
region. A bank can deviate to the prudent asset by choosing a deposit rate
r∗ =
δγ + α
2
− t
n
,
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and the total deposit of this deviating bank is given by
D
(
r∗, rG
)
=
α− δγ
2t
+
1
n
.
This deposit is too high so that if this bank offers r∗, it would still want to gamble. Note
that we need t/n > δγ−α2 in order to ensure non-negative expected profits. Let us look
at the total deposit generated by such deviation. Consistency requires that
α− δγ
2t
+
1
n
≤ mk
(1− θ)
(
α+δγ
2 − tn
)
−m
.
The above implies that this is the case if and only if
(
δ− α
γ
)(
δ +
1
γ
(
α− 2m
1− θ
))
≥ 0,
⇐⇒ (δ− δ¯)(δ− δ) ≥ 0,
where δ¯ ≡ αγ > δ, and δ is the other root of the the equation when the above expression
is satisfied with equality. Now consider the case when δ ≥ δ¯. This deviation is credible,
and we must check under what condition profit following a deviation to r∗ is not higher
than piG, i.e.,
αk +
1
t
(
α− δγ
2
+
t
n
)2
≤ θγk + θt
δn2
.
The above requires
δ(r¯ − γq) t
n
+
δ(α− δγ)2
4(1− θ) + q
(
t
n
)2
< 0,
where q = (δ− θ)/(1− θ). The above expression yields the following two roots of t/n.
z+ =
δ(γq− r¯)
2q
+
1
2q
√
δ2(γq− r¯)2 − δq(α− δγ)
2
1− θ ,
z− =
δ(γq− r¯)
2q
− 1
2q
√
δ2(γq− r¯)2 − δq(α− δγ)
2
1− θ .
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Straightforward calculations show that z− = δγ−α2 . Therefore, we only need to focus on
z+ (recall that, by assumption, tn > (δγ− α)/2). A deviation is not profitable as long as
t/n ≤ z+. Hence, we require
t
n
≤ min
{
2(δγ− 1)
3
, δγ− r¯, z+
}
,
in order to support a gambling equilibrium with deposit insurance. Tedious calculations
yield that
∂z+
∂δ
> 0.
Hence, this threshold is increasing in δ.
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Figure 2: Social welfare and market power
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